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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines whether the relationship between future firm performance and chief 
executive officer (CEO) stock option grants is affected by the quality of the compensation 
committee, the responsibilities of which include determining the CEO’s compensation 
package.  Compensation committee quality is measured using six committee 
characteristics – the proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent 
CEO, the proportion of senior directors with at least ten years’ board service, the 
proportion of directors who are CEOs of other companies, the aggregate shareholding of 
directors who are members of the compensation committee, the proportion of directors 
with three or more additional board seats (so-called “busy directors”), and compensation 
committee size.  The study documents strong evidence that future earnings performance 
is positively associated with stock option grants as compensation committee quality 
increases.   
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1. Introduction 
 Compensation committees have regularly attracted the attention of politicians and 
regulators because of their central role in establishing CEO compensation, and setting the 
parameters for the compensation of other senior executives.  In 1993, Congress passed 
legislation requiring that compensation committees be composed of two or more outside 
directors for performance-based pay in excess of $1 million to be tax deductible (Internal 
Revenue Code Section 162 (m)) and in 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) approved new listing rules that require all listed firms to have compensation 
committees that consist solely of outside directors.1  Although some studies (e.g., 
Anderson and Bizjak 2003, Newman and Mozes 1999, Vafeas 2003a) investigate 
compensation committees, there is substantially less published research on this committee 
than on audit committees (Klein 2003).   
           In this study, we investigate whether the relationship between CEO stock option 
grants and subsequent performance is affected by the quality of the compensation 
committee.  The argument is that better corporate governance is reflected in higher 
quality compensation committees which are capable of designing and implementing 
remuneration arrangements that will lead to stronger incentives for subsequent 
performance, and reduce the capacity of CEOs to extract rents.  A finding that the 
relationship between CEO option grants and future firm performance is increasing in 
compensation committee quality is consistent with this proposition. 
                                                 
1
  The relevant rules are NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and 
AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Sec 805. 
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We measure compensation committee quality using six metrics.  They are the 
proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO, the proportion 
of senior directors with at least ten years’ board service, the proportion of directors who 
are CEOs of other companies, the aggregate shareholding of directors, the proportion of 
directors with three or more additional board seats, and compensation committee size.  
We use these six measures as compensation committee quality is unlikely to depend on a 
single dimension and because similar measures have been used in the study of boards and 
audit committees.2  These six metrics are combined in two ways – by factor analysis and 
by aggregating scores for the six measures.  Thus, our measure of compensation 
committee quality is broader and more comprehensive than compensation committee 
independence (i.e., the proportion of outside directors on the committee) which has been 
used to measure compensation committee quality in much of the prior literature.  Put 
differently, we expect that compensation committee quality can differ even when all 
compensation committees are independent. 
Using a sample of 474 US listed companies all of which have independent 
compensation committees at a time when such independence was not required, we find 
evidence that the relationship between CEO stock option grants and subsequent one-, 
two- and three years ahead operating income increases as compensation committee 
quality increases.  This result also holds where stock returns are used as the performance 
                                                 
2
           Core et al. (1999) find that the proportion of outside directors on the board appointed by the CEO 
and the proportion of outside directors on the board who serve on three or more other boards are positively 
associated with the level of CEO compensation.  Bedard et al. (2004) use directors’ board service time and 
the number of directors on the audit committee as a proxy for committee expertise and activity, 
respectively.  Daily et al. (1998) suggest that directors who are CEOs of other firms may have lower 
governance quality.  Klein (2002a) documents a negative association between earnings management and 
the proportion of blockholders on the audit committee.   
  
3 
metric.  The results support the notion that a consequence of higher compensation 
committee quality is compensation contracts that result in superior future performance.  
Higher quality compensation committees appear to improve incentive alignment, and as a 
consequence, rent extraction is likely to be reduced. 
We contribute to the existing but limited body of research on compensation 
committee effectiveness (Daily et. al. 1998, Conyon and Peck 1998, Newman and Mozes 
1999, Anderson and Bizjak 2003, Vafeas 2003a, Conyon and He 2004) in several ways.  
First, we assess the effectiveness of compensation committees by examining the 
relationship between stock option grants and future firm performance.  The relationship 
between option grants and performance is of interest in addressing issues of the 
effectiveness of compensation arrangements, and the role of the compensation committee 
in this process is important as this committee has the delegated responsibility of making 
the recommendation to the board on CEO pay, among other tasks.   Second, we introduce 
a new and more comprehensive measure of compensation committee quality.  Such a 
measure is needed because under the 2003 stock exchange listing rules (which require 
independent compensation committees), the old measure of compensation committee 
quality – compensation committee independence – can no longer be used.  Third, our 
sample of 474 firms is significantly larger than that used in prior studies (the next largest 
is Vafeas 2003a, with a maximum of 267 firms).  Fourth, our data which are from 2001 
are more recent than data used in prior studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak’s (2003) 
sample period goes to 1998). 
  
4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related 
studies, develops the research design, and states the hypothesis.  Section 3 explains the 
analysis.  The results are reported in section 4 and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Studies, Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
2.1 General Motivation 
           There are a number of theoretical formulations that derive the result that incentive 
based compensation is a viable mechanism for aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders (e.g., Ross 1973, Becker and Stigler 1974, Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Lazear 1979, Holmstrom 1979, Demsetz and Lehn 1985).  In these models, the way in 
which compensation is structured ex-ante motivates managers to act in the interests of 
principals.  An ex-post outcome should be better performance, on average.   
            Prior empirical research documents evidence consistent with the view that 
compensation serves an incentive alignment role.  For example, using long-term stock 
market performance as a measure of corporate performance, Masson (1971) finds that 
firms with executives whose financial rewards are more closely parallel to shareholders’ 
interests outperform other firms over the post-war period.  Abowd (1990) finds that 
increased performance sensitivity in compensation is positively associated with increased 
subsequent corporate performance measured by either gross economic return or stock 
market performance, and Conyon and Freeman (2002) provide evidence that shared 
compensation in the U.K. is positively associated with either productivity measured by 
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real sales growth or stock market performance. 3   
            This study is closest in design to that of Hanlon et al. (2003).  They examine 
whether increasing stock option grants are associated with higher future earnings 
performance.  They document that one dollar of Black-Scholes value of stock option 
grant generates $3.71 of future operating income over the following five years.  They 
conclude that the payoff is attributable to the economic determinants of option grants and 
not to “poor” governance quality. 4  In sum, their results are consistent with their 
incentive alignment hypothesis and not with what they call a “rent extraction” story. 
            On the other hand, recent studies (e.g., Bebchuk et al. 2002, Bebchuk and Fried 
2003, 2004) have emphasized managerial power as a dominant influence in explaining 
the level and characteristics of executive pay.  Managers with more power are able to 
extract more rent, defined as value in excess of what they would receive under optimal 
contracting.  Therefore, the efficiency of compensation contracts would be discounted in 
some circumstances where compensation committees are less effective in fulfilling their 
duty or where it is easier for managers to shape their own pay arrangements.  The 
discounting of contracting efficiency would lead to an agency cost that is larger than its 
optimal cost, and a shareholder value that is smaller than its optimal value.  Thus, using 
incentive-based compensation contracts may not solve agency problems between 
executives and shareholders.  Instead, the agency problems can lead to rent extraction.  
Bebchuk and Fried are particularly critical of what they call “conventional” stock option 
                                                 
3
  These are profit sharing, profit related pay schemes, Save As You Earn schemes, and stock option 
plans, all of which had tax advantages in the United Kingdom at differing times from 1987 onwards. 
4
  Including the beginning of the year portfolio of executive options held, cash compensation, 
investment opportunities, current and prior year share performance, losses, leverage, and earnings volatility. 
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plans, e.g., plans based on at-the-money option grants, without indexing outcomes to 
benchmark performance, and where executives can sell their shares immediately after 
exercise. 
             Prior research also finds evidence consistent with this rent extraction or 
managerial power argument.  Core et al. (1999) examine whether a weak corporate 
governance structure leads to excess compensation, and then poorer future firm 
performance.  They find that the excess compensation paid to CEOs is negatively 
associated with subsequent firm performance.  Further, DeFusco et al. (1991) find that 
firms that changed their stock option plans over the 1987 – 1982 period experienced 
earnings declines relative to industry levels and long-term declines in cumulative 
abnormal returns, which suggests that the changes were unsuccessful as a means of 
generating improved performance.   
            In addition, several previous studies find that stock option plans have 
dysfunctional effects.  For instance, Yermack (1997) documents positive abnormal 
returns immediately after the granting of options, suggesting that CEOs receive stock 
options shortly before the announcement of good news.  Aboody and Kasznik (2003) find 
evidence consistent with the proposition that managers delay good news announcements 
until after the date of scheduled option awards, and accelerate bad news before the date of 
option awards.  Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that insiders time the exercise of 
stock options based on private information and Lie (2005) finds that abnormal stock 
returns are negative before unscheduled awards and positive after, and this pattern has 
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become stronger over time.  His results are consistent with the view that at least some 
award dates for the issue of executive options are set retrospectively. 
            In summary, the incentive alignment argument that executive compensation 
contracts align the interests of managers and those of shareholders and then enhance firm 
performance is supported by not only optimal contract theory but also evidence 
documented in several prior studies (e.g., Hanlon et al. 2003).  On the other hand, the 
argument that managers use compensation contracts to extract rents is consistent with the 
managerial power/rent extraction approach.  Some previous studies (e.g., Core et al. 
1999) also provide evidence supporting this argument.  
            We expect that whether executive compensation is associated with incentive 
alignment will depend on the strength of corporate governance.  Many studies find that 
high governance quality can constrain managerial opportunism (e.g., Klein 2002a, 
Carcello and Neal 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003).5  Thus, executive compensation is 
more likely to be associated with incentive alignment if corporate governance quality is 
higher, whereas the association of rent extraction with executive compensation will be 
higher if corporate governance quality is lower.  This suggests that the alignment of 
incentives by executive compensation contracts increases in corporate governance 
quality.  
            Since compensation committees are responsible for establishing, administering, 
overseeing, and advising on executive compensation plans, the corporate governance 
quality of these committees directly affects executive compensation.  Committees with 
                                                 
5
             Klein (2002a) measures governance quality using board independence.  Carcello and Neal (2000, 
2003) use audit committee independence as a measure of governance quality.  
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high governance quality can mitigate agency problems, and thus enhance incentive 
alignment.  Moreover, high corporate governance quality of compensation committees 
leads to better designed executive compensation contracts that can motivate managers to 
make superior decisions, resulting in better firm performance.  The relationship between 
operating income and stock option grants is derived from Lev and Sougianis (1996).  
Their production function states that operating income is a function of tangible and 
intangible assets. The latter includes the incremental intellectual capital contributed 
through the option granting process.  Thus, we expect that the association between stock 
option compensation and subsequent accounting performance will increase as 
compensation committee governance quality increases.   The hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H1       As compensation committee governance quality increases, the strength of the 
relationship between CEO stock option grants and future firm performance increases.  
 
2.2 Comprehensive Measure of Compensation Committee Governance Quality 
            The central issue is therefore how we might measure “compensation committee 
governance quality”.  We use six characteristics.6  
(1)  The first measure is what we call “CEO appointed directors”, which are 
directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO, and who are therefore likely 
to have a more amiable relationship with the CEO (e.g., Wade et al. 1990, Dailey et al. 
1998, Larcker et al. 2007).  Bebchuk and Fried (2004) state that there is a variety of 
                                                 
6
            We identified these six compensation committee characteristics based on two criteria: (1) they are 
supported by theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, and (2) the data are available in proxy 
statements.  
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social and psychological factors (collegiality, team spirit, a desire to avoid conflict, 
friendship and loyalty) that will lead to pay arrangements that reflect CEO power.  As a 
result of the CEO’s influence, all directors – but particularly CEO appointed directors – 
are likely to have an interdependent relationship with the CEO.  Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) assert that a nomination committee of the board is unlikely to nominate a 
candidate to become a director without approval of the CEO, and the process is likely to 
be that this committee will approve the candidate(s) that the CEO recommends.  Thus, a 
compensation committee with more CEO appointed directors is likely to be less effective.  
We use the proportion of CEO appointed directors on the compensation committee 
multiplied by -1 (APPOINT) as one component of committee quality.   
(2)  Long-serving directors are likely to be more effective because of their greater 
experience (e.g., Vafeas 2003b).  Arguably, long-serving directors will have greater firm-
specific reputational capital at stake (Fama and Jensen 1983).  Beasley (1996) finds that 
the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases as outside director tenure on the 
board increases, suggesting that long-serving outside directors are more effective in 
constraining accounting frauds.  On the other hand, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that 
long-serving outside directors are likely to remain entrenched as it is difficult to dislodge 
them without a crisis.  As we place emphasis on reputation and effectiveness being 
related to length of service, for our second measure of quality we use the proportion of 
directors on the committee with 10 or more years of board service time (SENIOR).7   
                                                 
7
   To the extent that “long-serving” equates to “old,” our prediction is in the opposite direction to 
Larcker et al. (2007) who hypothesize that old (greater than seventy) directors are less effective, but they 
find no support for that hypothesis. 
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(3)  Since CEOs are a relatively homogenous, cohesive collection of individuals 
(e.g., Useem 1984), the presence of CEOs from other firms on the compensation 
committee may result in a general propensity to support the CEO when deciding on pay 
issues (e.g., Lorsch and MacIver 1989, Daily et al. 1998).  Thus, a committee with a 
higher proportion of CEO directors will have lower governance effectiveness under this 
view.  Ezzamel and Watson (1997) refer to a “cosy collusion” between executive and 
non-executive directors who sit on each other’s compensation committees.  Fayere (2008) 
finds support for the view that CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less 
sensitive to firm performance when other CEOs serve on their boards, and that this excess 
pay is not explained by economic determinants associated with the riskiness of the job.  
On the other hand, Fahlenbrach et al. (2008) do not find any evidence that directors’ 
incentives are distorted by having CEOs on the board in testing what they call “the buddy 
hypothesis”.  So other CEOs might be more effective members because of their expertise 
and reputation, but we are not aware of any research that supports this view in the 
specific context of compensation committees.8  We use the proportion of the CEOs of 
other firms on the committee multiplied by -1 (CEODIR) as a third measure of 
compensation committee quality. 
            (4)  Directors with high stock ownership should have interests more aligned with 
shareholders and may have stronger incentives to monitor the CEO (Shivdasani and 
Yermack 1999).  Klein (2002b) finds that an outside block shareholder sitting on the 
                                                 
8
  With our data (referred to below), we find that the proportion of CEO directors is positively 
correlated with CEO stock option grants for our sample firms, suggesting that those directors may do the 
CEO a favor.   
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audit committee can constrain earnings management.  Friday and Sirmans (1998) report a 
positive relationship between market-to-book ratios and dollar values of director 
ownership for real estate investment trusts, which they interpret as indicating that 
increased director stock ownership assists in aligning managerial incentives with those of 
the stockholders.  Thus, we postulate that an independent committee with higher 
directors’ shareholdings will have higher governance quality.  We use the aggregate 
directors’ shareholding deflated by the number of directors on the committee as a fourth 
measure of compensation committee quality (SHARES).  Of course, extending Morck et 
al. (1988), excessive director shareholdings could lead to entrenchment, but in our 
sample, on average compensation committee directors hold only 0.23% of shares of the 
firm.  
           (5)  Core et al. (1999) find that busier outside directors on the board are associated 
with greater CEO compensation, suggesting that corporate governance of those directors 
is weak.  Again, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) provide evidence that firms with busy 
boards, those in which a majority of outside directors have three or more additional board 
seats, are associated with weak corporate governance.  Larcker et al. (2007) classify busy 
directors as increasing in “bad” governance, although Ferris et al. (2003) do not find any 
evidence that busy directors shirk their responsibilities.  We postulate that an independent 
compensation committee with a higher proportion of additional directorships will have 
lower governance quality.  We use the proportion of directors with three or more 
additional board seats on the compensation committee multiplied by -1 (BUSYDIR) as a 
fifth measure of committee quality.   
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           (6)  Bushman et al. (2004) argue that larger boards have the advantage of more 
advisors and monitors of management, and Agrawal and Knoeber (1999) advocate larger 
size boards in firms where information is otherwise difficult to obtain.  In the context of 
compensation, it is probably more difficult for CEOs to exert as much influence over a 
larger committee.  More independent compensation committee membership gives more 
opportunity for challenge of CEO excesses.  Thus, we argue that compensation 
committee quality is likely to be better when the number of directors on the committee 
(CMSIZE) is higher.9   
            To measure the overall governance quality of compensation committees, the study 
employs two comprehensive measures based on these six individual metrics.  The first 
comprehensive measure, CCQ1, is the factor score from a factor analysis of the six 
individual measures, adjusted by deducting the mean factor score in each two-digit SIC 
industry.  Using a factor score is attractive because it extracts a component that is 
common to the six committee characteristics.  The second comprehensive measure, 
CCQ2, is constructed by aggregating the governance quality scores of the six individual 
measures.  The quality score for an individual measure is coded 1 if the firm’s value of 
that measure is greater than the median of that measure and 0 otherwise.  CCQ2 is the 
sum of the quality scores of the six individual measures for the firm, adjusted by 
deducting the mean aggregate quality score in each two-digit SIC industry and deflated 
by 6.  Using an aggregate governance quality score has the advantage that it is better able 
                                                 
9
  Jensen (1993) argues that in the context of boards of directors, larger boards can be ineffective 
because of higher cooperation costs and more free riding.  However, since less than one percent of the 
compensation committees in our sample have more that eight directors, this argument has less relevance for 
our study. 
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to capture the orthogonal effects between monitoring mechanisms represented by the six 
committee characteristics.   
 In summary, this study attempts to determine whether the relationship between 
stock option grants and future firm performance is affected by the quality of the 
compensation committee, where compensation committee quality is measured using a 
combination of the six dimensions discussed in this section.  We now turn to the structure 
of the analysis to address this issue. 
 
3. Regression Model 
            We use two measures of future performance in our analyses.  Following Hanlon et 
al. (2003), we use future operating income as a measure of accounting performance.   As 
a second measure we use stock market performance.10  We use abnormal buy-and-hold 
returns for the period t+1 to t+3 (inclusive) in these tests. 
            In this section, we proceed in three steps.  We first state the benchmark model, 
which is an expansion of the one used in Hanlon et al. (2003).  We then add control 
variables in equation (2).  To address issues of endogeneity, we use a two-stage 
regression approach, with instruments specified to model the determinants of stock option 
grants and compensation committee quality.  These are given in equations (3) and (4).   
The benchmark model captures the relationship between future operating income 
and current stock option grants.  To test the hypothesis that future operating income is 
more positively associated with CEO stock option grants for firms with high 
                                                 
10
            However, Hanlon et al. (2003) argue that using a stock-based measure of future performance 
introduces a circular dependence in such tests. 
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compensation committee quality than for firms with low quality, the benchmark model is 
expanded by including the compensation committee governance quality variable and its 
interaction term with CEO stock option grants as follows: 
(OI/S)i,t+k =  γ0 + γ1CCQi,t + γ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + γ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + γ4(TA/S)i,t 
                              
+ industry fixed effects + e                                                                        (1)      
 where 
OI/S      =   the annual operating income before R&D expenses after selling and general 
administrative expenses, deflated by the annual sales in year t+1, t+2, and 
t+3,   
  
CCQ      =  compensation committee governance quality, i.e., (1) CCQ1, which is based 
on the first factor score from the factor analysis of the six committee 
characteristics in year t, and (2) CCQ2,  which is based on the aggregate 
quality scores of the six characteristics in year t,
 
 
CSO/S   =   the value of new stock option grants to the CEO in year t+1, deflated by the  
  annual sales in year t+1.11 The value of new stock option grants is calculated                   
using the Black-Scholes model similar to Rajgopal et al. (2006).  
Specifically, we collect the exercise price, stock price at the grant date, 
number of securities granted, and the time to maturity from the Execucomp 
database.  We use the approximate average yield in the data year from a 
seven-year U.S. Treasury bond as the risk-free rate of interest.  We measure 
expected stock return volatility by the annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns over the 120 trading days preceding the end of the fiscal year 
of the option grant,  
 
 TA/S      =    the total assets, deflated by the annual sales in year t. 
 We include total assets in our model since the operating income generated from 
corporate assets is a fundamental economic production function of these assets (Lev and 
                                                 
11
            Since prior research usually proposes that firm characteristics in year t affect the granting behavior 
of stock options in year t+1 (e.g., Core and Guay 1999), we include new stock option grants for the CEO in 
year t+1 in the model.  A reason for using firm characteristics in year t is that a number of stock grants are 
made during year t+1 rather than at the end of year t+1.  
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Sougiannis 1996).  Hanlon et al. (2003) also document evidence that total assets are 
positively associated with future operating income.  
 The main model for this analysis is shown in equation (2).  We augment equation 
(1) with several control variables that may affect the performance consequences of stock 
option grants.  We use SALES to control for size effects (e.g., Leone et al. 2006).  BM is 
added to control for the effects of growth opportunities (e.g., Gaver and Gaver 1993).12  
LEV is included for mediating the risk effects (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992).  John and 
John (1993) point out that the optimal management compensation package depends not 
only on the agency relationship between shareholders and management, but also on the 
contractual relationships that arise from having debt in the capital structure.  They derive 
a negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage, and Ryan and 
Wiggins (2002) demonstrate this empirically.  LOSS is used in the model in that 
performance may be treated differently between loss firms and profit firms in setting 
compensation (Hayn 1995).   
The model is:  
(OI/S)i,t+k = λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t  
                    + λ5SALESi,t + λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t + λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1  
                    + λ9LEVi,t + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ11LOSSi,t+ λ12LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 
                             
 + industry fixed effects + e                                                                (2)  
where 
SALES   =  sales, measured by the log value of net sales in year t, 
                                                 
12
              Gaver and Gaver (1993) document that option granting is more common with growth companies. 
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BM        =  book-to-market value, measured by the book value of assets over the sum  
                     of book value of liabilities and market value of equity in year t, 
 
LEV       =  leverage, measured by the debt-to-assets ratio in year t, 
LOSS  =    a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 for a loss firm in year t and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Equation (2) is run for years t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively, where year t is the 
year for which the data of compensation committee governance quality is available.13  
The model is also run by aggregating the three years’ ahead operating incomes (i.e., 
(OI/S)i,t+1 +(OI/S)i,t+2 +(OI/S)i,t+3).  To control for fixed industry effects, we include 
dummy variables for each two-digit SIC industry from which there are at least 10 firms in 
the sample.  If compensation committee governance quality has a positive impact on the 
performance consequences of CEO stock option grants, the coefficient γ3 will be positive 
and significant.14 
To address issues of endogeneity, we use a two-stage regression procedure similar 
to Frankel et al. (2006). 15  We rank firms by CEO stock options grants (i.e., CSO/S) and 
then categorize them into three equal-sized portfolios.  The portfolio rank of CSO/S (i.e., 
CSO/SRANK) is measured by 0, 1 or 2 for firms in the lowest, middle or highest portfolio, 
                                                 
13
            The continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
14
  In contrast, other studies such as Core et al. (1999) and Hanlon et al. (2003) first estimate the 
portion of compensation that is related to governance factors and then examine the association between 
governance-based estimated compensation and future firm performance.  A weakness of this approach is 
the potential measurement error in estimating governance-based compensation as a result of 
misspecification and omitted variables.  Our approach – examining the interaction between stock option 
grants and governance quality – allows us to assess the importance of governance quality without having to 
estimate governance-based option grants. 
15
  Issues of endogeneity are alleviated to the extent that it is future operating performance, up to 
three years out, that is being regressed on current stock option grants. 
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respectively.  Similarly, the portfolio rank of compensation committee governance 
quality (i.e., CCQRANK) is measured by 0, 1 or 2 based on the firms’ ranking of CCQ.16   
Our first-stage regressions involve modelling the determinants of stock option 
grants and compensation committee governance quality.  Based on prior research (e.g., 
Hanlon et al. 2003), the determinants of stock option grants are examined in the 
following model: 
(CSO/S)i,t+1 =  δ0 + δ1(R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t + δ4LEVi,t+ δ5NOLi,t  
                       +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t +δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1 + e                                    (3)      
where 
R&D/S   = the annual research and development expense, deflated by the annual                          
sales in year t,    
 
NOL      =  net operating loss, measured by 1 if net operating loss carry-forwards  
                     exist in the years t-2 to t and zero otherwise, 
 
DC        =  dividend constraint, measured by 1 if a firm experienced dividend            
constraints in years t-2 to t and zero otherwise.  A firm is                      
dividend constrained if the ratio of the sum of retained earnings and cash                      
dividends and stock repurchases over the sum of the prior year’s cash                       
dividends and stock repurchases is less than 2 in any of years t-2 to t,   
 
CFS      =  cash flow shortfall, measured by (common and preferred dividends +cash 
                     flow used in investing activities - cash flow from operations)/total assets,   
                     averaged over the years t-2 to t. 
 
            Further, we expect that the demand for high compensation committee governance 
quality will depend on the CEO’s influence, substitute monitoring mechanisms, and the 
                                                 
16
        We add CSO/SRANK or GQRANK in the models because endogeneity is likely to affect the 
variation in CSO/S or GQ rather than the level of CSO/S or GQ (e.g., Greene 2000).  Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001) note that a relatively crude measure of the endogenous variable can be used as an instrumental 
variable because it is likely to capture the level of the variable but not the endogenously determined 
variations around those levels.  
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firm’s growth opportunities and size.  Thus, we model the determinants of committee 
governance quality as follows: 
CCQi,t = µ0 + µ1CEOOWNi,t +µ2CEOTENi.t +µ3INSHDi,t+ µ4GROWi,t +µ5FSIZEi,t    
              + µ6CCQRANKi,t + e                                                                                 (4) 
where 
CEOOWN =   CEO ownership, measured by the percentage of shares owned by the                     
CEO in year t, 
 
 CEOTEN = CEO tenure, measured by the number of years for which the incumbent  
                        CEO has been the CEO of the firm in year t, 
 
INSHD      =  institutional shareholding, measured by the percentage of shares owned  
                         by institutional investors in year t, 
 
GROW      =  growth opportunities, measured by the geometric growth rate in the  
                        market value of assets through years t-2 to t,  
 
FSIZE    =  firm size, measured by the log of total assets in year t.  
 
We include CEOOWN and CEOTEN because Bathala and Rao (1995), Baker and 
Gompers (2003), and Kieschnick and Moussawi (2004) provide evidence that board 
independence decreases with CEO influence.  We include INSHD because institutional 
shareholdings may be a substitute monitoring mechanism (e.g., Brickley et al. 1988, 
Agrawal and Mandelker 1990, Rediker and Seth 1995).  We include GROW because 
several studies find that board independence is negatively associated with growth 
opportunities (e.g., Bathala and Rao 1995, Lehn et al. 2003, Linck et al. 2005).  Finally, 
we include FSIZE as Barclay and Smith (1995a, 1995b) argue that agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders increase with firm size.  After estimating equations 
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(3) and (4), a second stage regression (i.e., equation (2)) is run using the fitted value of 
CSO/S and CCQ from equations (3) and (4).   
              To consider the influence of the individual compensation committee quality 
factors, we also estimate equation (2) replacing CCQ with (i) each of the six measures 
individually (i.e., six separate models) and (ii) the six individual quality measures in a 
single model.  The former examines whether each compensation committee measure by 
itself is related to future performance.  The latter examines the relative influence of the 
six compensation committee quality measures. 
 We also test the hypothesis using stock market performance as a firm 
performance measure.  Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) find that stock market performance 
is positively associated with the incentives generated by executive stock option grants.  
Based on Kedia and Mozumdar (2002), we estimate equation (5), which is similar to 
equation (1) but uses future abnormal buy-and-hold returns in place of operating income: 
BHRETi,t3 = γ0 + γ1CCQi,t + γ2 (CSOINC)i,t+1 + γ3 CCQi,t*(CSOINC)i,t+1  
                     + industry fixed effects + e                                        (5)      
where 
BHRET  =  buy-and-hold abnormal return for years t+1 through t+3 compounded                    
monthly, computed each year as (1 + ri,1) x (1 + ri,2)...x (1 + ri,12) – (1 + 
rm,1) x (1 + rm,2)...x (1 + rm12), where ri,j is the raw return and rm,j is the 
portfolio return (based on the market index) for month j, 
 
CSOINC =  incentives generated by CEO stock option grants, measured by the delta 
(i.e., the hedge ratio) of CEO stock option grants multiplied by the ratio of 
the number of CEO stock option grants to the total shares outstanding 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990, Yermack 1997). 
 
In equation (5), a positive and significant γ3 would support H1. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
            The sample selection begins by searching the IRRC Directors’ database for the 
U.S. companies with compensation committees consisting solely of independent directors 
in 2001.17  We focus on independent compensation committees because we want to 
examine quality differences among independent compensation committees (since the 
2003 listing rules require independent compensation committees).  Based on the 
information of committee memberships and board affiliations provided by IRRC, we 
identify a raw sample of 1,225 firms with independent compensation committees from 
the population of 1,771 firms.  IRRC also provides directors’ information about employee 
positions, board service time, and shareholding that this study needs.  We then intersect 
the IRRC sample firms with the Execucomp database to yield a reduced sample of firms 
that also have information about the CEO’s service time and ownership.  We also review 
the proxy statements of the reduced sample firms from EDGAR SEC online 
documentation to collect the information about the number of directors’ additional board 
seats.  This yields a sample of 925 firms with the data for each of the six committee 
characteristics.  Finally, we reduce the sample by deleting the observations without the 
data used for the analyses from Execucomp, Compustat, and CRSP databases, 
respectively.  This generates a final sample consisting of 474 firms with independent 
                                                 
17
            We use directors’ information released in 2001 because 2001 was the latest data year in the IRRC 
Directors’ database when sample selection was initiated at the beginning of 2005.  Also, using the data for 
2001 allows us to avoid the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate governance.   
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compensation committees.  We find that the manufacturing (51.9%), services (12.2%), 
transportation, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services (10.8%), retail trade 
(8.2%), and finance, insurance, and real estate (7.4%) are the most widely represented 
industries in the sample.    
            Table 1, panel A reports the percentages of directors with certain characteristics 
on the compensation committee.  44.78% of 1,639 directors on the independent 
compensation committees of the 474 firms were appointed during the tenure of the 
incumbent CEO.  27.03% of the directors have at least 10 years’ board service time.  
23.06% of the directors are CEOs of the other firms.  97.96% of the directors on the 
compensation committee hold stock of the company.  35.69% of the directors have three 
or more additional board seats.  On average, there are about 3.46 directors on the 
compensation committee.  Table 1, panel B provides the descriptive statistics on the 
director characteristics.  The mean tenure of a director is about nine years.  The mean 
shareholding of individual directors is 0.23%, while the mean aggregate shareholding of a 
compensation committee is 0.80%.  On average, each director holds two additional board 
seats. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
      Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the main analyses.  
The means of OI/S for one-year, two-years, and three-years ahead are 0.212, 0.207, and 
0.212, while their medians are 0.178, 0.173, and 0.177, respectively.  The mean and 
median for CCQ1 are 0.000 and -0.060, while the mean and median for CCQ2 are both 
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0.000.18  CCQ1 is the first factor from the factor analysis of the six compensation 
committee measures, which has an eigenvalue of 1.358 and loadings of 0.534, 0.767, 
0.247, 0.458, 0.463, and 0.067 on APPOINT, SENIOR, CEODIR, SHARES, BUSYDIR, 
and CMSIZE, respectively.  CCQ2 is the aggregate quality score of the six compensation 
committee measures among which the highest correlation coefficient is 0.243 between 
APPOINT and SENIOR.   The mean CEO stock option grant (i.e., CSO/S) is 0.002, which 
compares with a mean of 0.005 for stock options granted to the top five executives in 
Hanlon et al. (2003).   
Insert Table 2 about here 
            Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the main independent 
variables.  The factor-based measure CCQ1 has a high correlation with the aggregate 
measure CCQ2 (r = 0.70).  The correlation coefficient between (TA/S) and SALES is 0.89.  
The regression results are not changed substantially when either of the two variables is 
dropped from equation (2).  In any event, our interest is in the sign and significance of γ3. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
 
 
4.2 Main Results    
            Table 4 contains the results of regressions that examine the effect of 
compensation committee governance quality on the performance consequences of CEO 
stock option grants for CCQ1.  We find that the coefficients on the interaction term of 
CCQ1 and CEO stock option grants are significant and positive for one-, two-, and three-
                                                 
18
  CCQ1 and CCQ2 are industry adjusted. 
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years ahead operating income, and aggregate three-year ahead operating income (t-
statistics = 3.28, 4.58, 3.81, and 4.25, respectively).  These results support the hypothesis 
that future operating income is more positively associated with CEO stock option grants 
for firms with high compensation committee governance quality as measured by CCQ1.  
In terms of our control variables, we find that the associations between future operating 
income and CEO stock option grants are significantly lower for firms with (i) small size, 
(ii) high book-to-market value, (iii) high leverage, and (iv) losses.  This is consistent with 
the view that small firms, low growth firms, and firms with losses have problems that 
cannot be easily addressed through incentive compensation.  The negative association 
between the leverage interaction terms and performance sensitivity is consistent with the 
prediction in John and John (1993). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
           Table 5 reports that the coefficients on the interaction terms between CCQ2 and 
CEO stock option grants are all positive and significant (t-statistics = 3.44, 4.67, 4.05, 
and 4.43, respectively), suggesting that the associations of CEO stock option grants with 
the one-, two-, three-year ahead operating income, and aggregate three-years ahead 
operating income are higher when firms have high compensation committee quality 
measured by CCQ2.  Again, we find that the performance consequences of CEO stock 
option grants are lower for small firms, low growth firms, highly levered firms, and firms 
with losses. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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            Table 6, panel A presents the results from examining the effect of individual 
compensation committee quality on the performance consequences of CEO stock option 
grants for APPOINT, SENIOR, CEODIR, SHARES, BUSYDIR, and CMSIZE, 
respectively.  First, the one-, and three-year ahead operating income, and the aggregate 
three-years ahead operating income are more positively associated with CEO stock option 
grants for firms when APPOINT is high, indicating that CEO stock option grants generate 
higher future operating income when the compensation committee contains fewer 
directors who were appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO.  Second, we also 
find a positive association between future operating income and CEO stock option grants 
for firms with more senior directors on the compensation committee (i.e., high SENIOR).  
Third, the interaction between CEODIR and CSO/S is positive and significant in all four 
models in panel A.  This indicates that CEO stock option grants generate higher future 
operating income when there are fewer directors on the compensation committee who are 
CEOs of other firms.  Fourth, the associations of the three-year ahead operating income, 
and the aggregate three-years ahead operating income with CEO stock option grants are 
higher for firms with high SHARES.  These results suggest that CEO stock option grants 
generate higher future operating income if directors who sit on the compensation 
committee hold more shares of that firm.  Fifth, Table 6, panel A provides evidence that 
the associations of the one-, and two-year ahead operating income, and the aggregate 
three-years ahead operating income with CEO stock option grants are higher for firms 
with high BUSYDIR, which indicates that CEO stock option grants generate lower future 
operating income when the compensation committee has more busy directors.  Sixth, the 
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two-year ahead operating income is more positively associated with CEO stock option 
grants for firms with large compensation committees.  Overall, we also find support for 
H1 using individual compensation committee quality measures. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
           Table 6, panel B reports the results of the regression including all the six 
individual compensation committee quality measures in the same model.  We find that 
SENIOR*(CSO/S) is consistently and positively related to future income whether 
measured using the one-, two-, or three-years ahead operating incomes, or the aggregate 
three-years ahead operating income, suggesting that SENIOR is the dominant quality 
component on a relative basis.  We also find significant coefficients for 
APPOINT*(CSO/S) and BUSYDIR*(CSO/S) in three of the four models and for 
CEODIR*(CSO/S) in two of the four models, which suggests these are more influential 
dimensions of quality of a relative basis.  Finally, we find significant coefficients for 
SHARES*(CSO/S) and CMSIZE*(CSO/S) in only one of the four models.  Overall, this 
suggests that the effects of SENIOR, APPOINT, BUSYDIR, and CEODIR dominate the 
effects of SHARES and CMSIZE on a relative basis. 
Table 7 presents the results from testing the hypothesis where firm performance is 
measured by stock market performance.  If H1 is supported, the coefficient on the 
interaction term between compensation committee quality and incentives provided by 
CEO stock option grants, i.e., γ3 in equation (5) will be positive and significant.  We find 
that the coefficient on the interaction of CCQ1 and the incentives is positive and 
significant, consistent with H1.  We also find that the coefficient on the interaction 
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between CCQ2 and stock option incentives is positive and significant.  Thus, we find 
support for H1 using a stock market measure of performance when compensation 
committee quality is measured by either CCQ1 or CCQ2.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
4.3 Robustness Tests     
           We also conduct additional analyses to test the robustness of the results.  First, we 
use the discounted expected gain approach instead of the Black-Scholes model to value 
stock options.  Hall and Murphy (2002) show that valuing stock options using the Black-
Scholes model results in overvaluation as the option cannot be traded, or (normally) 
hedged, and when the employee is risk-averse and undiversified.  Ittner et al. (2003) note 
that employees may use simple approaches rather than the complicated Black-Scholes 
model to value stock options.  They propose the discounted expected gain approach to 
value stock options by assuming an annual stock price growth of 15%, a five-year 
holding period, and a risk-free rate of 5%.  We find that the one-, two-, three-year ahead 
operating income, and aggregate three-years ahead operating income are also more 
positively associated with CEO stock option grants for firms with high CCQ1 or CCQ2 
when the discounted expected gain approach is used (untabulated).  
            Second, we examine whether the results hold after adding non-CEO executives’ 
stock option grants.  Thus, we include the total of new stock option grants to all 
executives covered by the Execucomp database.  Similar results (untabulated) are found 
for both CCQ1 and CCQ2.   
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            Third, we replace stock option grants in year t+1 with option grants in year t in 
equation (2) to examine whether the results are sensitive to the presumption that grants in 
year t+1 reflect the governance quality in year t.  The results (untabulated) hold for both 
CCQ1 and CCQ2. 
            Fourth, this study also examines whether the results hold after controlling for the 
non-linear relation between stock option grants and future operating income.  Hanlon et 
al. (2003) document a concave relation between stock option grants and future operating 
income.  Thus, we add the second power term of stock option grants in equation (2).  
Again, we document significant evidence for both CCQ1 and CCQ2 (untabulated). 
            Fifth, we test the robustness of the results by adding historical operating income 
in the model as Larcker (2003) argues that historical operating income is a natural 
benchmark for future operating income.  Untabulated results show that one-, two-, and  
three-year ahead, and aggregate three-years ahead operating income are significantly 
positively associated with CEO stock option grants for firms with higher CCQ1 or CCQ2.  
           Sixth, we examine whether compensation committee quality is an additional 
characteristic, over a general measure of the quality of board governance.  Following 
prior research (e.g., Klein 2002a), we measure board quality using board independence.  
After adding board independence and its interaction with stock option grants in equation 
(2), we still find that future operating income is more positively associated with CEO 
stock option grants for firms with high compensation committee quality than for firms 
with low compensation committee quality, whereas we find no evidence on the positive 
impact of board independence on the performance consequences of stock option grants.  
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These results suggest that compensation committees serve a particular monitoring 
mechanism, which is additional to the general monitoring mechanism of boards.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 We extend the limited research on compensation committee effectiveness.  While 
prior studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003, Vafeas 2003) focus on compensation 
committee effectiveness and CEO pay, we focus on the effect of compensation committee 
quality on the relation between stock option grants and future firm performance.  
Additionally, because U.S. listing rules now require all compensation committees to be 
composed solely of independent directors, we develop a broad, multidimensional 
measure of compensation committee quality.             
 We find that CEO stock option grants for firms with high comprehensive 
compensation committee quality generate higher future operating income.  In addition, 
we also find strong evidence that the relation between future performance and CEO stock 
option grants is significantly affected by the six individual compensation committee 
characteristics, i.e., the proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the 
incumbent CEO, the proportion of senior directors with at least 10 years’ board service, 
the proportion of directors who are CEOs of the other firms, the aggregate shareholding 
of directors, the proportion of directors with three or more board seats, and compensation 
committee size.  Finally, the results hold after conducting various additional tests.  
Combined, our results support the view that higher compensation committee quality leads 
to greater incentive alignment in executive compensation contracts. 
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            Like all studies, this study also has its own caveats.  First, it is likely that there are 
significant differences between companies in the IRRC Directors’ and the Execucomp 
databases, which were used to collect the sample, and other companies with regard to 
governance characteristics and structure of CEO stock options.  Thus, using the firms 
from the IRRC Directors’ and the Execucomp database may affect the generalizability of 
our results.  Also, we limit our sample to firms that had independent compensation 
committees in 2001 and that survived from 2001-2004.  Thus, our sample may be biased 
toward firms that had better governance and that were more successful.  Future research 
may focus on expanding the sample to include firms not covered by these databases or 
using data from after 2003 when independent compensation committees became 
mandatory.  Finally, although this study identifies six compensation committee 
characteristics based on the literature, the question of whether these six committee 
characteristics can reflect the overall picture of a compensation committee’s governance 
quality is still open.  Future research may refine the development of governance quality 
measures by adding other committee characteristics to those used in this study. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of compensation committees 
 
Panel A.  Percentages 
                
Percent of compensation committee directors appointed during the tenure 
of incumbent CEOs 
 44.78% 
        
Percent of compensation committee directors with at least 10 years’ 
board service time  27.03% 
        
Percent of compensation committee directors who are CEOs of other 
firms  23.06% 
        
Percent of compensation committee directors who hold stock of the 
company 
 97.96% 
     
Percent of compensation committee directors who have three  or more 
additional board seats  35.69% 
      
Panel B. Descriptive statistics 
            
Characteristics Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Compensation committee size 3.430 3.000 1.880 2.000 10.000 
Director tenure 9.163 8.000 6.347 1.000 45.000 
Individual shareholdings 0.227% 0.024% 1.471% 0.000% 29.450% 
Aggregate shareholdings 0.801% 0.133% 3.181% 0.000% 43.407% 
Additional board seats 2.169 2.000 1.383 0.000 12.000 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of variables 
              
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
(OI/S)t+1 474 0.212 0.178 0.153 0.102 0.272 
(OI/S)t+2 474 0.207 0.173 0.154 0.105 0.276 
(OI/S)t+3 474 0.212 0.177 0.155 0.107 0.274 
CCQ1t 474 0.000 -0.060 0.919 -0.581 0.505 
CCQ2t 474 0.000 0.000 0.197 -0.133 0.148 
(CSO/S)t+1 474 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.001 
(TA/S)t 474 1.601 1.078 1.907 0.750 1.700 
SALESt 474 7.477 7.438 1.489 6.390 8.480 
BMt 474 0.619 0.631 0.299 0.391 0.844 
LEVt 474 0.199 0.191 0.155 0.061 0.305 
LOSSt 474 0.129 0.000 0.335 0.000 0.000 
(R&D/S)t 474 0.052 0.003 0.128 0.000 0.056 
NOLt 474 0.304 0.000 0.460 0.000 1.000 
DCt 474 0.321 0.000 0.467 0.000 1.000 
CFSt 474 -0.192 -0.182 0.124 -0.259 -0.115 
CEOOWNt 474 0.013 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.008 
CEOTENt 474 7.426 6.000 6.032 3.000 10.000 
INSHDt 474 0.654 0.680 0.166 0.500 0.800 
GROWt 474 1.223 1.086 0.490 0.970 1.300 
FSIZEt 474 7.617 7.482 1.604 6.500 8.600 
       
(OI/S)t+1 : one year-ahead operating income, measured by the annual operating income before R&D 
expenses after SGA, deflated by the annual sales in year t+1.  
(OI/S)t+2 : two years-ahead operating income, measured by the annual operating income before R&D 
expenses after SGA, deflated by the annual sales in year t+2.  
(OI/S)t+3 : three years-ahead operating income, measured by the annual operating income before R&D 
expenses after SGA, deflated by the annual sales in year t+3.  
CCQ1t: comprehensive measure of compensation committee governance quality based on the first factor 
score from the factor analysis of the six compensation committee characteristics in year t. 
CCQ2t: comprehensive measure of compensation committee governance quality based on the aggregate 
quality scores of the six compensation committee characteristics in year t. 
(CSO/S)t+1 : the Black-Scholes value of new stock option grants for the CEO in a year, deflated by the 
annual sales in year t+1. 
(TA/S )t : the total assets, deflated by the annual sales in year t. 
SALESt : sales, measured by the log of net sales in year t. 
BMt : book-to-market value, measured by the book value of assets over the sum of book value of liabilities 
and market value of equity in year t. 
LEVt : leverage, measured by the debt-to-assets ratio in year t. 
LOSSt: loss firm in year t, measured by 1 for a loss firm and 0 otherwise.  
(R&D/S)t: annual research and development expense, deflated by the annual sales in year t,    
NOLt: net operating loss, measured by 1 if net operating loss carry-forwards exist in the period of year t-2 
to t and zero otherwise. 
DCt: dividend constraint, measured by 1 if a firm experienced dividend constraints in the period of year t-2 
to t and zero otherwise.  A firm is dividend constrained if the ratio of the sum of retained earnings and cash 
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dividends and stock repurchases over the sum of the prior year’s cash dividends and stock repurchases is 
less than 2 in any of years t-2 to t.   
CFSt: Cash flow shortfall, measured by (common and preferred dividends +cash flow used in investing 
activities - cash flow from operations)/total assets, averaged over the period of years t-2 to t. 
CEOOWNt: CEO ownership, measured by the percentage of shares owned by the CEO in year t. 
CEOTENt: CEO tenure, measured by the number of years for which the incumbent CEO has been the CEO 
of the firm in year t. 
INSHDt: institutional shareholding, measured by the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors 
in year t. 
GROWt: growth opportunities, measured by the geometric growth rate in the market value of assets through 
years t-2 to t.  
FSIZEt: firm size, measured by the log value of total assets in year t.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Pearson correlations among independent variables 
(n =474) 
                                  
Variables CCQ2t (CSO/S)t+1 (TA/S)t SALESt BMt LEVt LOSSt (R&D/S)t NOLt DCt CFSt CEOOWNt CEOTENt INSHDt GROWt FSIZEt 
CCQ1t 0.70*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.07   0.02 -0.05  0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09*  0.03 -0.03 -0.18*** -0.11** -0.10** -0.08* 
CCQ2t  -0.01 -0.06 -0.16***   0.09* -0.03  0.07 -0.03  0.01 -0.03  0.04  0.02 -0.14*** -0.07 -0.06 -0.17*** 
(CSO/S)t+1    0.24*** -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.05  0.05  0.48***  0.06  0.21*** -0.13*** -0.01  0.02  0.04  0.45*** -0.20*** 
(TA/S)t    -0.03  0.04  0.00  0.07  0.36*** -0.04  0.04  0.20*** -0.05  0.01 -0.00  0.23***  0.35*** 
SALESt      0.09**  0.05 -0.19*** -0.35*** -0.02 -0.27***  0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13***  0.03 -0.23***  0.89*** 
BMt       0.25***  0.15*** -0.34*** -0.07 -0.13***  0.43*** -0.01 -0.06 -0.17*** -0.46***  0.10** 
LEVt        0.01 -0.13***  0.03  0.09**  0.04 -0.10**  0.02  0.04 -0.11**  0.08 
LOSSt         0.33***  0.07  0.19***  0.24*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.13***  0.05 -0.14*** 
(R&D/S)t          0.15***  0.25***  0.03 -0.06  0.04 -0.00  0.43*** -0.17*** 
NOLt           0.08* -0.05 -0.07 -0.02  0.13***  0.04 -0.04 
DCt           -0.01  0.03  0.05 -0.00  0.25*** -0.22*** 
CFSt            -0.12** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.23***  0.20*** 
CEOOWNt              0.34*** -0.14***  0.07 -0.18*** 
CEOTENt               0.02  0.11** -0.12** 
INSHDt               0.05   0.00 
GROWt                                -0.09* 
                 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Results for comprehensive compensation committee quality measure, CCQ1 
            
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 1-Year Ahead 2-Year Ahead 3-Year Ahead Total 
Intercept ? 0.124 0.040 0.039 0.203 
  (2.67)*** (0.76) (0.75) (1.46) 
CCQt  ? -0.013 -0.016 -0.013 -0.042 
  (-1.89)* (-2.03)* (-1.63) (-2.01)** 
(CSO/S)t+1 ? 4.999 3.901 24.317 33.218 
  (0.50) (0.35) (2.19)** (1.12) 
CCQt*(CSO/S)t+1  + 7.771 12.218 10.010 30.000 
  (3.28)*** (4.58)*** (3.81)*** (4.25)*** 
(TA/S)t + 0.043 0.035 0.036 0.114 
  (13.61)*** (9.82)*** (10.37)*** (12.15)*** 
SALESt  ? 0.004 0.011 0.014 0.029 
  
(0.84) (2.11)** (2.64)*** (2.06)** 
SALESt*(CSO/S)t+1  ? 6.445 6.939 2.900 16.284 
  
(4.58)*** (4.37)*** (1.86)* (3.88)*** 
BMt  ? -0.121 -0.068 -0.110 -0.299 
  
(-4.90)*** (-2.46)** (-4.04)*** (-4.08)*** 
BMt*(CSO/S)t+1  - -29.155 -29.600 -13.737 -63.492 
  
(-3.61)*** (-2.26)** (-1.53) (-2.64)*** 
LEVt  ? 0.105 0.055 0.063 0.224 
  
(2.53)** (1.17) (1.37) (1.80)* 
LEVit*(CSO/S)t+1 - -53.814 -29.947 -32.287 -116.048 
  
(-6.68)*** (-3.30)*** (-3.61)*** (-4.84)*** 
LOSSt ? 0.012 0.021 0.046 0.079 
  
(0.66) (1.06) (2.30)** (1.48) 
LOSSt*(CSO/S)t+1  ? -21.011 -26.645 -26.089 -73.745 
  (-4.36)*** (-4.91)*** (-4.88)*** (-5.14)*** 
 
 
    
Industry dummies 
 
Included Included Included Included 
 
 
    
N 
 
474 474 474 474 
F-statistic 
 
26.96*** 18.16*** 20.08*** 24.85*** 
Adjusted R2 
 
58.80% 48.54% 51.19% 56.73% 
 
     
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The two-stage regression models are as follows: 
(OI/S)i,t+k =λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t  + λ5SALESi,t  
              
+ λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t +λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ9LEVi,t  + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1  
         + λ11LOSSi, +λ12 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e                                                  (2)                             
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t  
          +δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e     (3)     
CCQi,t  =  µ0 + µ1CEOOWNi,t +µ2CEOTENi.t +µ3INSHDi,t+ µ4GROWi ,t+µ5FSIZEi,t  
          + µ6CCQRANKi,t  + e                                                                                                                       (4) 
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where 
CSO/SRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CSO/S. 
CCQRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CCQ. 
The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
Total indicates the sum of 1-year ahead, 2-year ahead, and 3-year ahead operating income. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed.
Table 5 
Results for comprehensive compensation committee quality measure, CCQ2 
            
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 1-Year Ahead 2-Year Ahead 3-Year Ahead Total 
Intercept ? 0.121 0.037 0.035 0.192 
  (2.59)** (0.69) (0.67) (1.38) 
CCQt  ? -0.066 -0.100 -0.077 -0.237 
  (-2.04)** (-2.62)*** (-2.15)** (-2.48)** 
(CSO/S)t+1 ? 2.364 -0.565 20.539 22.339 
  (0.24) (-0.05) (1.86)* (0.75) 
CCQt*(CSO/S)t+1  + 35.272 53.933 46.008 135.213 
  (3.44)*** (4.67)*** (4.05)*** (4.43)*** 
(TA/S)t + 0.043 0.035 0.036 0.114 
  (13.67)*** (9.84)*** (10.42)*** (12.20)*** 
SALESt  ? 0.004 0.012 0.014 0.030 
  
(0.88) (2.13)** (2.67)*** (2.10)** 
SALESt*(CSO/S)t+1  ? 6.762 7.461 3.345 17.568 
  
(4.81)*** (4.70)*** (2.15)** (4.20)*** 
BMt  ? -0.115 -0.059 -0.103 -0.277 
  
(-4.66)*** (-2.14)** (-3.77)*** (-3.78)*** 
BMt*(CSO/S)t+1  - -30.006 -21.738 -14.695 -66.439 
  
(-3.72)*** (-2.39)** (-1.64) (-2.77)*** 
LEVt  ? 0.089 0.027 0.039 0.154 
  
(2.11)** (0.56) (0.85) (1.24) 
LEVit*(CSO/S)t+1 - -47.531 -20.301 -23.947 -91.780 
  
(-5.69)*** (-2.16)** (-2.59)** (-3.69)*** 
LOSSt ? 0.012 0.022 0.046 0.080 
  
(0.67) (1.08) (2.31)** (1.50) 
LOSSt*(CSO/S)t+1  ? -19.846 -24.690 -24.394 -68.930 
  (-4.11)*** (-4.54)*** (-4.56)*** (-4.80)*** 
 
 
    
Industry dummies 
 
Included Included Included Included 
 
 
    
N 
 
474 474 474 474 
F-statistic 
 
27.07*** 18.20*** 20.21*** 24.97*** 
Adjusted R2 
 
58.90% 48.59% 51.36% 56.86% 
 
     
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The two-stage regression models are as follows: 
(OI/S)i,t+k =λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t  + λ5SALESi,t  
              
+ λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t +λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ9LEVi,t  + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1  
         + λ11LOSSi, +λ12 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e                                                  (2)                             
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t  
          +δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e     (3)     
CCQi,t  =  µ0 + µ1CEOOWNi,t +µ2CEOTENi.t +µ3INSHDi,t+ µ4GROWi ,t+µ5FSIZEi,t  
          + µ6CCQRANKi,t  + e                                                                                                                       (4) 
where 
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CSO/SRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CSO/S. 
CCQRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CCQ. 
The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
Total indicates the sum of 1-year ahead, 2-year ahead, and 3-year ahead operating income. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed. 
 
Table 6 
Results for individual compensation committee quality measures 
            
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 1-Year Ahead 2-Year Ahead 3-Year Ahead Total 
      
Panel A. Separate regression 
for each individual measure      
      
 
APPOINT
,t*(CSO/S)t+1  + 10.913 10.683 36.105 52.228 
  (1.81)* (1.55) (4.65)*** (2.90)*** 
      
SENIOR
,t*(CSO/S)t+1  + 23.175 26.579 24.318 74.072 
  (3.18)*** (3.20)*** (2.99)*** (3.39)*** 
 
     
CEODIR
,t*(CSO/S)t+1  + 29.382 40.703 17.651 87.736 
  (3.35)*** (4.09)*** (1.79)* (3.33)*** 
      
SHARES
,t*(CSO/S)t+1  + 331.911 1117.841 3101.542 4551.293 
  (0.39) (1.15) (3.30)*** (1.78)* 
      
BUSYDIR
,t*(CSO/S)t+1 + 21.192 37.352 8.852 67.396 
  (3.12)*** (4.90)*** (1.16) (3.31)*** 
      
CMSIZE
,t*(CSO/S)t+1  + 1.910 4.438 -1.627 4.721 
  (0.95) (1.93)* (-0.73) (0.78) 
      
Panel B. Regression including 
all individual measures      
      
 
APPOINTt*(CSO/S)t+1  + 9.003 13.372 17.858 40.233 
  (1.40) (1.83)* (2.51)** (2.09)** 
      
SENIORt*(CSO/S)t+1  + 16.766 16.116 19.592 52.474 
  (2.13)** (1.81)* (2.26)** (2.24)** 
      
CEODIRt*(CSO/S)t+1  + 12.678 20.521 15.264 48.463 
  (1.31) (1.87)* (1.43) (1.67)** 
      
SHARESt*(CSO/S)t+1  + -176.476 526.413 2902.243 3242;179 
  (-0.20) (0.52) (3.00)*** (1.24) 
      
BUSYDIR
,t*(CSO/S)t+1 + 14.924 23.319 1.891 40.135 
  (1.75)* (2.42)** (0.20) (1.57)* 
      
CMSIZEt*(CSO/S)t+1  + 2.916 5.346 -0.788 7.474 
  (1.42) (2.30)** (-0.35) (1.22) 
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The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The regression models for Panel A are as follows: 
(OI/S)i,t+k =λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t  + λ5SALESi,t  
              
+ λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t +λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ9LEVi,t  + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1  
         + λ11LOSSi, +λ12 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e                                                  (2)                             
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t  
          +δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e     (3)     
CCQi,t  =  µ0 + µ1CEOOWNi,t +µ2CEOTENi.t +µ3INSHDi,t+ µ4GROWi ,t+µ5FSIZEi,t  
          + µ6CCQRANKi,t  + e                                                                                                                       (4) 
where  
CCQ is one of the six individual compensation committee quality measures, APPOINT, SENIOR, CEODIR, 
SHARES, BUSYDIR, and CMSIZE. 
APPOINT: CEO appointed directors, measured by minus the proportion of directors on the compensation 
committee appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO. 
SENIOR: Senior directors, measured by the proportion of senior directors with 10 or more years of board 
service time on the compensation committee. 
CEODIR: CEO directors, measured by minus the proportion of the CEOs of other firms on the 
compensation committee. 
SHARES: Directors’ shareholdings, measured by the aggregate shareholdings of directors on the 
compensation committee, deflated by the number of directors on the compensation committee. 
BUSYDIR: Busy directors, measured by minus the proportion of directors with three or more additional 
board seats on the compensation committee. 
CMSIZE: Committee size, measured by the number of directors on the compensation committee. 
CSO/SRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CSO/S. 
CCQRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by each individual measure.. 
In Panel A, equation (3) is estimated for each individual measure separately.  
The regression models for Panel B are as follows:     
 (OI/S)i,t+k = ψ0 + ψ1(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ2APPOINTi,t +  ψ3APPOINTi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ4SENIORi,t  
              + ψ5SENIORi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ6CEODIRi,t + ψ7CEODIRi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ8SHARESi,t  
              + ψ9SHARESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ10CMSIZEi,t + ψ11CMSIZEi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +ψ12(TA/S)i,t  
              + ψ13 SALESi,t + ψ14 SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ15 BMi,t + ψ16 BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ17 LEVi,t   
              + ψ18 LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1  + ψ19 LOSSi, + ψ20 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t++ industry fixed effects + e    (2’)  
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t  
              +δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e       (3)      
CCQi,t  =  µ0 + µ1CEOOWNi,t +µ2CEOTENi.t +µ3INSHDi,t+ µ4GROWi ,t+µ5FSIZEi,t  
             + µ6CCQRANKi,t  + e                                                                                                                      (4) 
In Panel B, equation (3) is  estimated for all six individual measures simultaneously. 
The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
Total indicates the sum of 1-year ahead, 2-year ahead, and 3-years ahead operating income. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed. 
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Table 7 
Results on stock market performance 
 
        
Variables Predicted sign CCQ1 CCQ2 
                      
Intercept ? 0.567 0.548 
  (6.66)*** (6.46)*** 
            
CCQt  ? -0.006 -0.079 
  (-0.09) (0.79) 
    
CSOINCt+1 ? 13.524 15.226 
  (2.92)*** (3.28)*** 
    
CCQt*CSOINCt+1 + 9.324 58.440 
  1.68* (2.62)*** 
                     
Industry dummies  Included Included 
    
N                474 474 
F-statistic  1.96** 2.36*** 
Adjusted R2   3.33% 4.65% 
    
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The regression model is as follows: 
BHRETi,t3 = γ0 + γ1CCQi,t + γ2 (CSOINC)i,t+1 + γ3 CCQi,t*(CSOINC)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e    (5)      
where  
BHRET: buy-and-hold abnormal return, for years t+1 through t+3 compounded monthly each year, 
computed as (1 + ri,1) x (1 + ri,2)...x (1 + ri,12) – (1 + rm,1) x (1 + rm,2)...x (1 + rm12), where ri,j is the raw return 
and rm,j is the portfolio return (based on the market index) for month j. 
CCQ: compensation committee governance quality, i.e., two comprehensive measures, CCQ1 and CCQ2. 
CSOINC: Incentives generated by CEO stock option grants, measured by the delta (the hedge ratio) of CEO 
stock option grants multiplied by the ratio of the number of CEO stock option grants to the total shares 
outstanding. 
The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
